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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
BENNJ1~TT ~IO'TOR

COMPANY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

I

Jl.ARK L. LYON, THE TRAVEL- . Case No.
EI-tS IN~URANCE COMPANr.-, \: 9680
a corporabon,
D ef end an t s,
c·N ITED S TATE S FIDELITY
AND GL:ARANTY COMPANY,
Defendant-Responde,nt . .

1\.PPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE
THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE
COUNTY, UTAH
HONORABLE MARCELLUS K. SNOW,
JUDGE

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action by plaintiff-appellant to recover
from each of the defendants plaintiff-appellant's damages occasioned by the destruction of a motor vehicle
1
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truck sold by the appellant to the defendant Mark L~
Lyon, which truck was insured by the defendants
Travelers Insurance Cmnpany and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company.
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court. From a judgment
in favor of the defendant United States Fidelity and
Guaranty Co., the plaintiff appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment in favor
of the defendant United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co. and judgment in its favor as a matter of law.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 15, 1958, the defendant Mark L. Lyon
purchased from the appellant a 1957 Ford 8 T 700
Dump Truck for the price of $10,700.00 (Exhibit
No. I ) . Title to the motor vehicle was retained by
Bennett Motor until full payment was made in accordance with the terms of the conditional sales contract
(Exhibit No. 1). On September 7, 1960, the defendant
Mark L. Lyon owed appellant $8,143.34 on the conditional sales contract (Exhibit No. 6).
On October 21, 1960, the defendant Lyon intentionally destroyed the motor vehicle by setting it afire
2
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·or

I~

·or~

Jll'

(Finding X o. 8, R. 56 and H. ~07). Plaintiff has
obtained a default judgment against the defendant
~[ark L. Lyon. which is unsatisfied (R. 37, 38. 39).
The District Court dismissed plaintiff-appellant's
complaint against the defendant The Travelers Insurance Company upon stipulation of the said defendant and appellant (R. 173, 174, 175). This stipulation
provided that any judgment which may be recovered
against the defendant United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., respondent, would be reduced by one-half in
consideration of' the stipulation dismissing The Travelers Insurance Co.
Respondent United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co. issued an automobile-liability and physical dan1age
policy No. C1569348 on December 16, 1959, insuring
the dump tllick (Exhibits No. 2 and No. 18). The
named insured in the insurance policy was the defendant
Mark Lyon, and an endorsement contained a loss-payable clause in favor of the plaintiff Bennett l\iotor Co.
(Exhibit No. 3).
The loss payable clause in favor of plaintiff (Exhibit 3) contains two clauses applicable to this appeal.
It provides that:
"Loss or damage, if any, under the policy shall
be payable as interest may appear to lienholder
Bennett l\Iotor Company, 47 West 6th South,
and this insurance as to the interest of the Bailment Lessor, Conditional Vendor or Mortgagee
or Assignee of Bailment Lessor, Conditional
, . .endor or Mortgagee (herein called the Lien-

3
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holder) shall not be invalidated by any act or
neglect of the Lessee, Mortgagor or Owner of
the within described automobile nor by any
change in the title or ownership of the J?roperty;
provided, however, that the conversiOn, embezzlement, or secretion by the Lessee, Mortgagor or Purchaser in possession of the property
insured under a bailment lease, conditional sale,
mortgage or other encumbrance is not covered
under such policy, unless specifically insured
against and premium paid therefor;** * ."
And the loss payable clause also has this provision:
"The company reserves the right to cancel
such policy at any time as provided by its terms,
but in such case the Company shall notify the
Lienholder when not less than 10 days thereafter
such cancellation shall be effective as to the interest of said lienholder therein * * * ."
The policy itself has no provision for notice to the
loss payable payee, but in paragraph 24 on cancellation
provides:
" * * * This policy may be cancelled by the
Company by mailing to the Named Insured at
the address shown in this policy written notice
stating when not less than 10 days thereafter
such cancellation shall be effective. The mailing
of notice as aforesaid shall be sufficient proof of
notice. * * * "
Mr. Dan Firmage, Loan Officer and Insurance
Clerk at 'Valker Bank & Trust Co. (R. 68) testified
that his company has no insurance policy or notice
of cancellation of any policy involved in this action
(R. 70-71) and no evidence that it had ever received

4
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a notice of eancellation ( R. 70-71). It took an assignInent of the conditional sales contract on r\ugust L3,
1U58, and returned that contract to appellant, after
pay-off hy appellant, on November 4, 1960 (R. 69
and see R. 92 as to the date) .
.c\lene K. Dobbs, insurance clerk for appellant at
the ti1ue of the loss occasioned herein and employed by
Bennett ~1otor until October 31, 1961 (R. 72), testifie<l it was her duty "to see that all vehicles that were
in 11ennett Finance were covered by insurance" ( R. 72) .
\ll 1natters concerning insurance of covered vehicles
came to her attention (R. 72). The witness was asked
if she had examined the file of Bennett Motor Co. on
the :\Iark L. Lyon vehicle, and she stated that she had
( R. 73). She stated that she had no recollection of ever
receiving a notice of cancellation similar to Exhibit 4
(R. 73-7-1!). She testified:
4

"Q. Upon receipt of such notices, what is your
custom to do?

A. Well, the first thing would be to inform Mr.
Yergensen, who is my superior, that a cancellation had been issued on one of our customers, and then, from there, we would
proceed to inform the insured that we had
received such cancellation, and ask that they
make sure that they have insurance coverage.
Q. 'Vhat was it your custom to do with the
notice of cancellation itself?
.A.. To put that in the file--the personal file.
Q. And there is in the file one policy to which

5
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is attached the notice of cancellation; isn't
there?
A. That's right; yes." (R. 74).

"'Q. Now, you have testified that, if notice of
cancellation were received, as to any automobile, other action would follow?
A. That's right, sir.
Q. Was there any other action that you know
of, or that you can recall, connected with
Mark Lyon?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you have a specific recollection as to the
Mark Lyon file?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was that one of the buyers that had come
to your personal attention 1
A. Yes, sir." (R. 77-78).
Mr. Virgil G. Yergensen, the Office and Credit
Manager of appellant, testified that he had responsibility of insurance coverage on automobiles ( R. 79-80).
He was responsible for collection of the Mark Lyon
account, which was assigned to \Valker Bank ( R. 80).
lie testified that the defendant Lyon was behind in his
payments continually under the conditional sales contract ( R. 82) . He testified as to the office procedure
of Bennett Motor and as to how he would have been
notified had the Notice of Cancellation been received
in the Mark Lyon matter, and his responsibilities to see
that there was insurance coverage. He stated that he did

6
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t-

not reeeive ~ oti('<: of Cancellation on the ~lark l..~yon
insurance policy with the respondent ( R. 83) . He
stated that he did not learn until after the accident
that respondent was the insurance cmnpany involved
( R. 83-84). He testified that an agent of Travelers
Insurance Co. informed him that Travelers insured the
loss and not the respondent U.S.F. & G. (R. 84).
"Q. You conducted all negotiations with Travelers about this?
.A. No. I didnt; talked to Mr. Burton Tingey
of U.S.F. & G.

Q. 1'. ou have any correspondence with him?

A. None.
Q. He told you the policy had been cancelled?
r\. He told me the policy had been cancelled.
'Ve found no evidence we had ever been
notified.

Q. When did he tell you that?

A. Sometime in November.
Q. Did he tell you there was notice of cancellation in his file, or copy of one?

A. He said he could .find none.-'-' (R. 110).
The witness pointed out that Jlr. Tingey said he
would look into the matter and find out about it (R.
117) as follows:
"Q.

~Ir. Yergensen, you started to give a conversation with Mr. Tingey; you said that he
told you he would make inquiry and get in
touch with you, I believe.

7
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A. Yes.
Q. Did he do that?

A. Yes, he did.
Q. How much later?
A. Approximately a week.

Q. Did you talk to him the second time on the
telephone?
A. Yes.

Q. Or in person?
A. Both times.
Q. Both times on the telephone?
A. Right.
Q. What was your conversation the second
time?

A. Mr. Tingey called up, said he was calling
in reference to that inquiry I had made and
he said he had gone to Heber J. Grant's
files, and failed to find any indication that
we (he) had been notified of the cancellation of policy." (R. 118).
The defendant ~lark L. Lyon testified that the
only notice of termination or suspension or cancellation
from the respondent U.S.F. & G. was a suspension of
insurance dated December 31, 1959 (R. 127). ~Ir.
Lyon testified that he had never received a notice resembling Exhibit 4 (R. 128). On April 7, 1960, he
was living at the address shown on Exhibit 4 (R. 128).
Regina Lyon, the wife of defendant Mark L.
Lyon, was shown E~xhibit 4 and asked whether or not

8
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a docutnent resembling this was ever receiYed by her
at the 'Vest Jordan address in April of 1960. She
stated:
"Q. Did a copy of something similar to this come
to the home in West Jordan?

A. Not that I am aware of, no." (R. 152).
Nina l\Iarie Roberts, Endorsement and Cancellation Clerk at the Heber J. Grant Co. (R. 189), was
asked as to Mark L. Lyon's insurance policy-Exhibit
No.2:
"Q. Do you have any me1nory concerning how

it is you saw that?
.t\. I sent out a cancellation notice on it.
Q. To whom did you send it?

D'

A. To the insured, Mark Lyon, and also to the
lienholder.
Q. To the lienholder?

A. Yes.
Q. Now, do you have an actual memory in
your mind at this time, Mrs. Roberts, of having sent out to the lienholder, or are you
basing that upon some other basis?
A. I am not basing that on this actual lienholder. It is hard to remember as many as
we send out each month.
Q. You do remember sending a cancellation
notice to Mr. Lyon, himself?

1

n~

A. Yes, I do.
Q. Now, what is your custom and practice, as
9
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it was taught you when you started yol!r work
and as vou continued to perform It, concerning· cancellation noti~es, when you are
instructed to cancel a policy?
A. I take the policy, and I send out a
tion notice to the insured, and,
check the policy, and, if there is a
able or lienholder. we send out a
tion notice to them, also.

cancellaalso, we
loss-paycancella-

Q. Is that a duplicate to one-you customarily
send to the lienholder a duplicate of the one
sent to the insured?
A. Yes.
Q. This is Exhibit 4, which is a photo copy of a
document, Mrs. Roberts; do you recognize
the document that it was?

A. Yes.
Q. What is it?
A. It is the cancellation notice which was sent
out to the insured, Mark Lyon.
Q. And in the custom and habit and routine of
your office, you would send an identical
notice to a lienholder?

A. Yes, I would.
Q. So that there is no misunderstanding, you
do not have an independent, specific memory of having done so to Bennett l\Iotor in
this case?

A. No; but I am sure that we did because we
hold the policy for at least ten days after
we have sent it out, and, at that time I
check it over and make sure that there ~as

10
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a cancellation notice Inailed out to the insured and to the loss-payable before forwarding it down to the home office." (R.
189, 190, 191).
~lrs.

Roberts testified that she is not the Inailing clerk
(R. 191). She testified that she takes the mail to a
mailing clerk who with regard to cancellation notices
takes it to the post office without using a meter, but
places a stamp on it and takes it over to the post office
with a Certificate of Mailing (R. 192). She was asked:
"Q. You have no recollection of mailing any particular cancellation notice, have you, :\Irs.
Roberts?

A. No.
Q. Nor do you have any recollection as to
whether in the Mark Lyon case, you delivered notice of cancellation to the mail
clerk?

A. Yes.
Q. You have no specific recollection of it?

A. No, but they have the certificate of mailing
to show it.
Q. \.,.. ou know what your practice is; do you
have the certificate of mailing with you?

A. The U.S.F. & G. Company has it.
Q. Do you have it with you?

A. No.
Q. Can you produce it ?
A. I'm sure U.S.F. & G. can.
11
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MR. BIRD: Can you produce it, Mr. Snow?
MR. SNO'V: I am trying to.
MR. BIRD: You have it?
MR. SNO'V: Not here; I didn't intend to put
my case on today, Mr. Bird. In view of
developments, I am forced to put mine in.
I expected to go on tomorrow.

TilE COURT: Now, if you want that, we certainly will give whatever leeway you need.
If you can't proceed further without it, at
this point, we can recess, as far as that goes.

MR. SNO,\T: See how long takes with her.
lVIR. BIRD: \V ell, I don't know why we are
speculating about this witness, if we have
the notice. Now, at the pre-trial, I asked
for :any document in the possession of this
company that would show mailing to Bennett Motor Company; was advised they
had no such document, and I am interested
to know what they have. This is a surprise
to me.
MR. SNO'V: I ·will state for the record what
the situation is. I have seen no document;
I have heard this morning that there is one
in Baltimore, Maryland, and I have telegraphed for it. If it gets here by airmail,
we will have it; if it doesn't, we won't. I
have never seen it; I don't know what it
says. Don't know whether it will support
my position here, or whether it won't.
This morning, for the first time I heard
. was, and asked my associate
'
where tlus
to
telegraph for it.

12
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T II 11~ COURT:..:\ t such ti1ne as it becmnes available to you, you will make it available to
the court and counsel?
l\IR. SNO'V: Certainly; if it does not come in
time, I would have all 1\Irs. Roberts hascan find, I will have. (R. 193-194).
~Irs.

Roberts testified that she does not sta1np n
cancellation on the policy and send it to the home office
until she checks to see if the mailing notices have been
signed and returned. She stated that the fact that the
policy had been sent to the hmne office indicated to
her in her routine that she did see a returned mailing
notice (It. 199). Exhibit 17 is a blank form illustrative
of the type of notice Mrs. Roberts testified to (R. 200).
She testified that the certificate works as follows:

"Q. 'Vould someone sign that?
A. No; it is taken over to the post office, and
there is a space there it says "Postage" and
"Postmark." We place a stamp on this,
attach it to the envelope. The envelope is
taken to the post office, where the postmaster takes the letter, sealed, and stamps
this, and gives it back to our mailing clerk,
and she brings this back to the office, where
we hold it for the ten days' waiting period.
THE COURT: What is the receipt for?
A. To prove mailing out in the mail.

Q. (By 1\Ir. Snow) The postageA. There is a place here where we put a stamp.
Q. .._c\. postage stamp?

13
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A. Yes; and that is stamped by the postmaster
at the post office.
THE COURT: That is your charge for their
services, they received that piece of mail?
A. Yes ; it was deposited in the mail to be sent.
Q. (By lVIr. Snow) Merely shows it reached
the post office; doesn't show beyond that?"
(R. 201).

ARGUMENT
POINT I. UNDER THE LOSS PAYABLE
ENDORSEMENT, THE INSURER WAS REQUIRED TO NOTIF'Y THE APPELLANT OF
CANCELLATION.
The District Judge made a conclusion of law that
the insurance policy of respondent was cancelled and
not in effect at the time of the loss (R. 56). This was
presumably based upon Findings of Fact number 5
and 6 where the District Court found that notice was
sent to Appellant in the ordinary business routine and
practice of respondent's agent, Ileber J. Grant &
Company (R. 55).
The proof offered by respondent indicates that it
was of the opinion that mailing the notice of cancellation was a compliance with the provision for cancellation regardless of whether the Notice was received,
or else it relied solely on the inference that the notice
was received by the appellant from the purported proof
of business practice in mailing.
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Appellant subtnits that the requirement of notice
of cancellation to the insured under the policy itself.
awl the requirement of notifying loss payable payee
under the Loss Payable Endorsement were entirely
different and that the latter required proof that the
notice was receiYed. The cancellation clause of the policy
was Paragraph 24 of :Exhibit ~. This "Standard Cancellation Clause" was before this Court in Diamond 1'
lltah, Inc. 'l's. Canal Insurance Co1npany, 12 c·. 2d
37, 40 ~ 3() 1 P. 2d 665, as to which this Court said:
"The majority of these decisions, under what
"·e believe to be the best reasoning, hold that the

actual receipt of the Cancellation Notice by the
insured is not a condition precedent to the cancellation of the insurance by the insurer, provided the Cancellation Notice itself contains a
fixed date on which the cancellation is to become
effective."
..c-\nd the Court went on to observe that since the cancellation clause was not followed strictly, proof of mailing was not enough.
"Thus, Canal, not having strictly complied
with the policy provisions, the mere mailing of
the Notice was not sufficient proof of notice."
But notice to the appellant is governed by the loss
payable clause, which has no provisions as to mailing
and provides instead:
"'fhe Company reserves the right to cancel such
policy at any time as provided by its terms, but
in such case the Company shall notify the Lienholder when not less than ten days thereafter
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such cancellation shall be effective as to the interest of said Lienholder therein * * * ."
Since there is no provision for mailing to the last
known address or any other address, the language of
the Diamond T case applies, and the respondent has a
burden of proving that notice had been received. The
independence of the Loss Payable Clause in establishing the rights of the loss payable payee and the insurer,
between themselves, is supported by Commercial Credit
Corporation vs. Pren~ier Ins'ltrance Company~ 12 L~.
2d 321, 366 P. 2d <i76. There the insured had given
notice to the Company of cancellation of the policy
and the insurer had made a settlement, but neither
party had given notice to the loss payee, and this Court
found the rights of the loss payee to be governed by
the Loss Payable Clause.
Insurance cases hold generally that where there
is no contract as to the type of notice to be given or that
mailing is sufficient, the burden is upon the insurer to
prove that notice was received by the person being
notified. United Assur. Asso. v. Frederick~ 130 Ark.
12, 195 S'V 2d 691; Castner v. Farm,ers M.F. Ins. Co.~
50 Mich. 273, 15 N.,V. 452; Couch on Insurance 2d
Section 32:108, page 328 of Volume 6, Giving as
Against Receiving Notice.
Under the theory of the Dia1nond T case~ respondent's proof of a business practice or routine was supposed to raise an inference both that the Notice of
Cancellation was maj}ed to appellant and that appellant
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received it. Appellant offered positive testi1nony that
no Notice of Cancellation was received by it ( R. 73-7 4,
77-78 & sa). .And also evidence that the X otice of
Cancellation purportedly mailed to the insured Lyon
was not received at his home by hi1n or his wife (R.
1:27 & 1 ;3:2). Respondent takes the position, presumably,
that the inference that there was mailing supports the
inference that the Notice was received and survives the
direct evidence of the appellant that the Notices were
not received, and leaves an issue of fact which was
resolved by the Court in favor of the respondent.
Respondent must fail on this argument for the
reasons that :
I. There was no proof of mailing.
:2. Failure to produce the mailing Certificate was

fatal.
3. The proof offered (Exhibit 4) did not include
proof of notice to appellant.
I. There was no proof of mailing.

Appellant does not challenge the rule that it will
be inferred (or presumed) that mail is delivered to the
addressee by the Government where it is shpwn that
n1ail properly addressed, with prepaid stamps, is placed
in the United States l\Iail. It may also be admitted
that the business routine of a substantial concern, showing systematic mailing, is relevant to the proof (\Vigmore on Evidence Section 95 citing Brown vs. Fraternal
Association, 18 lT. 265, 55 P. 63).
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But the respondent here offered no evidence from
the person who was charged with the responsibility of
mailing, and Mrs. Roberts did not testify that it is her
duty to place postage on the notices. She only testified
that:
"We place a stamp on this, attached it to the
envelope." (R. 201).
In Matsko vs. Dally~ Washington~ 301 P. 2d
1074-1078, the appellant had testified as to the existence
of an office custom of mailing invoices, but had testified
that he, himself, did not mail office correspondence
and had no personal knowledge of mailing the particular invoice. Respondent denied receipt of the invoice.
In holding that there was insufficient proof of mailing,
the Court said:
" ( 10) The rule is that, when an office handles
such a large volume of mail that no one could
be expected to remember any particular letter
or notice, proof of mailing may be made by showing ( 1) an office custom with respect to mailing,
and (2) compliance with the custom in the specific instance. Lieb v. Webster, 30 "\Vash. 2d 43,
190 P. 2d 701; Farrow v. Department of Labor
& Industries~ 179 Wash. 453, 38 P. 2d 240.
( 11) No office clerk or other person who customarily mailed office correspondence was called
to testify. Appellant has established an office
custom but has failed to establish compliance
therewith in the specific instance. Consequently,
we hold that there is no presumption of receipt
by respondent because there was not sufficient
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evidence to establish the Inailing. Therefore, the
court did not err in rejecting the proffered exhibit."
In the very recent case of 1 1 exas l!Jmployees Insurance Association v. JVerm.sl~·e, (Texas, 1962, 349
S.\V. ~d 90, the Supreme Court held that testimony
that a letter was prepared and placed on the secretary's
desk for mailing was not enough:
"The secretary did not testify in the case.
\ Vhere the sender relies on office custom to support the inference of mailing, the n1ajority rule
is that there must be corroborating circumstances
to support the inference that the custom has been
carried out."
Likewise in State Bank of East Moline vs. Standaert, 335 Ill. 519, 82 N.E. 2d 393-396, the Illinois
Court reviewed the authorities and held that there must
be smne evidence from the person whose duty it was
to place the mailing pieces in the mail, and that dictating
a letter as office custom of mailing is not enough:
"From a review of the cases, however, it is
evident that while Courts may not require the
person mailing the letter for a large concern to
have a distinct recollection of the particular
letter, there must be some evidence on the part
of the person whose general practice it was to
post the mail that the custom was complied with
on the date in question."
'rhe annotation on this question at 86 ALR 541
& 5-!-! supplements the earlier annotation at 2.5 ..~.-\LR

13, and cites the majority rule as requiring that there
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n1ust be a con1pliance with the custom such as evidence
of the employee whose duty it was to take the letters
for deposit and mail them that he actually did so, citing
numerous cases, and at page 546, citing two cases indicating that in Yery large organizations where recollection of mailing would be impossible, testimony from the
actual mailing clerk would be cumulative only. The
small office of Heber J. Grant & Company does not
place it within the category of those cases. (See R.
191).

The case of Mohr vs. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corporation (1958) 216 Md. 197, 140 A. 2d 49 at 52, holds
that testimony as to the normal procedure of mailing
to customers to the address noted on the record is held
sufficient to raise a presumption of mailing without
testimony from the person who actually mailed the
letter, but the Court cites this as the minority view
The mischief of this minority view lies in the fact
that if a concern wants to prove mailing of a notice
it need only offer proof that an item of business was
handled in the ordinary routine and yet positive testimony that the notice, or mailing piece, was never
received raises only a counter presumption and leaves
an issue of fact which may be arbitrarily resolved
against the evidence. In this case there wasn't opportunity to examine the person who did the mailing and
who might well have remembered this incident since
the Mrs. Roberts who was called to testify said she
remembered Inailing a notice to Mark Lyon (R. 190).
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:!. Failure to produce the mailing certifkate was

fatal.
Apparently the respondent was not satisfied with
its ordinary routine Inailing custom and for that reason
devised a In ore certain system of sending out Certificates
of :\lailing such as the blank fortn Exhibit
to giYe
proof in specific cases that the post office received the
mailing piece (R. 197 and 200-202). Counsel advised
the Court that respondent company had such a certificate and that it would be produced (R. 193 & 194).
This statetnent of counsel was not evidence, and was
sheer bravado in Yiew of the earlier testimony of tlH~
witness Yergensen that shortly after the loss occurred
he had contacted l\lr. Burton Tingey of respondent
corporation, who had reported back to him that there
was no evidence in the files of the mailing of the Notice
of c.ancellation to appellant (R. 110 & 118). 'I'hus
the Yery document which respondent itself has established in its routine and relies on as giving evidence of
mailing was non-existent in this case and destroys the
intended effect of testitnony as to the custom of mailing.

11,

Respondent is, therefore, asking the Court to infer
frmu the testitnony as to the custom of mailing from a
person not the mailing clerk that there was at one time
eYidence of mailing in the file for this policy, and then
to indulge the further inference that because a Certificate of )!ailing had once been in the file that would
raise the further inference there had been an actual
mailing of the X otice of Cancellation and the further
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inference that the mail had been delivered. This is too
tenuous to have probative value (See 95 ALR 162).
3. The proof offered (Exhibit 4) did not include
proof of notice to appellant.

The witness Roberts identified Exhibit 4 as having
come from the respondent's file in this case (or the
file of Heber J. Grant & Company, which was respondent's agent) and as giving evidence that under
the office routine the Notice of Cancellation had been
Inailed out. She testified:
"I take the policy, and I send out a Cancellation Notice to the insured, and, also, we check
the policy, and if there is a Loss Payable or
Lienholder, we send out a Cancellation Notice
to them, also." ( R. 190).
And then she testified that the notice to the lienholder
would be a duplicate of Exhibit 4. But examination
of Exhibit 4 discloses that the Notice of Cancellation
is addressed to Mark Lyon, 3761 West 7800 South,
West Jordan, ·utah, and there is no mention whatever
of the appellant, or of any other lienholder. The only
reasonable inference to be drawn from that Exhibit,
and the denial by Appellant that any Notice of Cancellation was ever received is that as far as appellant
is concerned, the office routine broke down and there
was no checking of lienholder and no evidence that
Notice of Cancellation was ever given to the lienholder.
If such notice had been prepared, a duplicate would
be in the file alongside Exhibit 4 or a notation made
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on ~~xhibit 4 that a copy had gone to the lienholder.
That is what Burton Tingey looked for but failed to
find (It. 118) .
..:\ nu1nber of cases are specific that where the copy
produced from the file shows a particular address, or a
wrong address, or the wrong person, the only inference
that can be drawn from the testimony is that the original
was Inailed, or attempted to be 1nailed, as shown on
the file copy. nr alkcr Banll· & 'l'rust Company 'l.'S. Firs!
S cl'urif.tf CorporationJ 9 U. 2d ~15 at 219, 3-1<1 P. ~d
944 at 94G (wrong address) ; Fln7.L'Crs vs. Aetna Casuarf.tf lwntrcd ComJHl1Z/f, 163 F. 2d -1<11 (file does not
show the address used); J{ikcr 'l'S. C.I.R., C1\ 4, :218
F. :?d 389 (wrong address); Oli11cr vs. Fair Jn,.:clers,
Inc. (Ga. r\pp.) 1:21 SE 2d 787; Selken vs . .~..Yorthland
Insurance Comprlll.ff (Iowa), 90 X'Y ~d 29, H~. 388
(wrong address). Respondent's proof, therefore, leads
inevitably to the conclusion that if the office procedure
was followed, a Notice of Cancellation was mailed to
)lark Lyon and not to appellant.
It thus appears that the denial of the appellant's
employees that any Notice of Cancellation was received
by it has raised a presumption or inference of nonreceipt. This is bolstered by the fact that had Bennett
)lotor Cmnpany received notice that the insurance was
cancelled, it would surely have taken steps to replace
the insurance in order to protect itself, since the cost
of the insurance would be borne by the insured, and
not by it.
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The shakiness of respondent's evidence on this
point was indicated also by the vacillation of the trial
judge. The first Findings of Fact included numbers
6 and 7 and Conclusion No. 2, which found that no
Notice of Cancellation was given to the appellant (R.
35, 36) . These were served .January 27, 1962, and
signed February 2, 1962. ~lu~reafteP, the F8Sp9Rd.8Rt
(}Bj e~tefl t<:> the Fiudiug~ Thereafter, the respondent
objected to the Findings and Conclusions (R. 43) .After
argument, the Trial Court took the matter under advisement and, without mentioning Notice of Cancellation, approved respondent's proposals (R. 50). In
support of the argument that the Court should change
its Findings and Conclusions on this point, counsel for
respondent had argued that since the case was going to
the Supreme Court in any event, the Trial Court should
give itself as broad a basis as possible with the Supreme
Court and supply an issue of fact against appellant.
The issue of law on appellant's right to recover after
intentional destruction of the vehicle was not under consideration on respondent's objections since the first
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared by
the appellant also held against appellant on that point
( R. 35-36) . This argtunent, though not reported, is
mentioned as having significance and as an explanation
of why, against overwhelming evidence, the Findings
on this point were changed.
Respondent has failed to produce the mailing
clerk to testify that the practice of mailing was reasonable and was followed in this case, which is required
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by the n1ajority of Courts; the respondent failed to

pro<luee the Certificate of )!ailing which under its
business routine is the one document which gives probative eYidence that the notice of the particular policy
was delivered to the post office, properly addressed and
with postage prepaid; and finally, the proof of the
respondent includes a file copy of a X otice of Cancellation addressed only to l\Iark Lyon and giving no
evidence that any notice was sent to the appellant as
the loss payable payee or that any loss payable payee
was notified. In view of the evidence of the appellant
that the notice was not received, this Court should
reverse the Trial Court and hold that no proof of delivery of notice to the appellant of cancellation of the
policy was before the Court, and the policy was, therefore, in full force and effect.
POINT II. IF MAILING ONLY \VAS REQlTIRED, THERE IS NO PROOF THE NOTICE OF C.ANCELLATION \VAS l\IAILED.
Respondent 1nay argue that the provision permitting
notice to be mailed at the address shown in the policy
is all that has to be given as to the insured and that
the same proYision will be read into the loss payable
clause. This is not tenable. Insurance policies are strictly
construed against the company preparing and issuing
the policy. Con~mercial Credit Corporation vs. Premier
Insurance CompanJJ~ supra~· Huber & Rolland Construction Company vs. Cif.lJ of South Salt Lake~ 7 U.
2d :27H. 323 P. 2d :259.
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But if the Court holds that proof of mailing was
all that was required, then respondent has still failed
in its proof for all of the reasons indicated under Point
L It is said at 95 ALR 162, that Courts generally hold
that an inference upon a dependent inference will not
be per1nitted, citing innumerable cases, but that this
statement of the rule is not entirely accurate. This
annotation suggests that the real reason for the rule
is that when a failure of complete proof makes necessary
an inference of the missing fact, the evidence becomes
too tenuous if that fact supplied by inference is then
utilized as the basis for a further inference of another
fact that cannot be proven. This reasoning applies in
the case before the Court. Mrs. Roberts testified to her
part of the office routine and then attempted to testify
to the mailing portion, which was performed by an
entirely different person as though that person would
have testified in the same way; she also testified that
c.u.sTf»~r•l"<.cl
t11e u e an d f ormed the
C erb'ficates of M a1'1'1ng wereA1n
basis of her action in cancelling policies, and yet in this
case, the Certificate of Mailing is missing and apparently was always missing, according to the testimony
of .1\Ir. Y ergensen; and furthermore, the copy of the
Notice of Cancellation identified by Mrs. Roberts
shows only Mark Lyon and his address as persons to
whom the original might have been sent, and there is
no testimony that postage was placed on the envelopes.
Respondent asked the Trial Court to overlook all of
these Inissing pieces of evidence and all of this evidence
that the mailing routine broke down in this case and
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indulgejl' the inference that X otice of Cancellation had
been Inailed to the appellant and to accept that tenuous
inference against the compelling testimony of ~Ir.
Yergensen and :\Irs. Dobbs in behalf of the appellant
that no Notice of Cancellation was ever received· in
their office, and that had it been received, they would
haYe taken steps to replace the insurance (R. 7-J.. 80-83).
This Court should hold that there was no competent
proof that Notice of Cancellation was ever mailed to
the .Appellant and that the policy was still in full force
and effect on the date the loss occurred in October,
19li9.

POINT III. IF THE INSURANCE POLICY
'V ..:\..S IX FORCE, APPELLANT CAN RECOVER AFTER INTENTIONAL DESTRUCTION.
The Loss Payable Clause (Exhibit 3) provides
tlm t the insurance shall be paid to the lienholder and:
''shall not be invalidated by any act or neglect
of the Lessee, Mortgagor or Owner of the within
described automobile nor by any change in the
title or ownership of the property; provided,
however, that that conversion, embezzlement or
secretion by the Lessee, .:\Iortgagor or Purchaser
in possession of the property insured under a
bailment lease, conditional sale, mortgage or
other encumbrance is not covered under such
policy, unless specifically insured against and
premium paid therefor * * * ."
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This is known as the Standard Clause, sometimes called
the Union Clause, which is to be distinguished from
the Open Mortgage Clause which makes the mortgagee's right derivative from the mortgagor's and
which, therefore, cannot exceed the mortgagor's rights.
In Vol. 5 of Couch on Insurance, Section 1215 (b)
at pages 4439 to 4440, that learned writer states that
the standard or union clause effects a separate contract
with the mortgagee, which is not invalidated by acts
of the mortgagor, listing all types of losses and failures
and conduct as not vitiating the protection of the mortgagee including:
"in further illustration of facts and circumstances which have been held not to avoid a policy
containing a standard or union mortgage clause,
as to the mortgagee, may be noted the act of the
mortgagor in destroying the insured building
by burning it, * * * ."
citing the cases of Wagner vs. Peters_, 142 Va. 412, 128
SE 445, where there was clearly no liability to the
insured, but stating that there might be liability to
the creditor under the mortgage clause, and Commonwealth vs. Cali, 247 Mass. 20, 141 NE 510, in which the
insured conveyed the premises, without notice, and
either fired the building or went away and let it burn,
and the Court held that in neither case was the policy
invalidated as to the mortgagee.
Volume 5 Appleman Insurance Law & Practice
is similar and in Section 3401 at page 554 distinguishes
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betwee11 the open Joss payable clause, which sitnply

provides that:

"Loss, if any, is payable to B as his interests
shall appear."
and the standard or union form, which contains the
language above quoted that the insurance:
"shall not be inntlidated by any act or neglect
of the mortgagor or the owner of the within described property."
.And at page 560 this treatise says:
·'.A distinction which is rather important to
grasp is that the policy terms are themselves
not nullified by a standard mortgage clause. It
is, rather, that a new contract containing those
provisions is made with the mortgagee personally; and the mortgagee is not bound by the mortgagor's contract which, while it may be identical
in language, may be breached by the mortgagor's
ad. In other words, the indemnity of the mortgagee is not placed at the whim of his debtor, and
is subject only to breaches of which the mortgagee is, himself, guilty. It has been properly
stated that in some instances, certain of the provisions of the fire policy are modified and, under
certain conditions, even omitted In~ the new
agreement which springs from th~ mortgage
clause and the insurance policy."

And at page 561, the sa1ne author contrasts this by
saying:
"In the open form, the indemnity of the mortgagee is subject to the risk of every act and neglect of the mortgagor which would avoid the
original policy in the mortgagor's hands."
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Similar is a discussion in 29 American Juris prudence on Insurance, Sections 731 and 732, where it is
said at page 990 that fraudulent statements in procuring insurance, do not defeat the morgtagee, nor does
holding under a fraudulent conveyance.
"Similarly, a breach by the mortgagor of a
clause in an automobile collision policy to the
effect that the policy does not apply while the
automobile is used in any illict trade or transportation, being a condition not relating to the subject matter of the insurance, does not affect the
rights of the mortgagee."
citing Piedmont Fire Insurance Co. vs. Fidelity ltlortgage Co., 250 Ala. 609, 35 So. 2d 352. This case holds
that the policy determines such things as the property
covered, amount, rate and terms; but otherwise the
standard or union clause makes a separate and independent contract between insurer and mortgagee.
This Court in Commercial Credit Corporation vs.
Premier Insurance Co., supra, held that the rights of
the loss payable payee are independent of the rights
of the insured, although limited in that case to cancellation of the policy by the insured.

Tarleton vs. DeVeuve., C.A. 9, 113 Fed. 2d 290,
states that the standard clause is an independent contract and protects the mortgagee despite the non-payment of premiums and against cancellation, and:
"shall not be invalidated by any act of the
owner, means that it shall not be injuriously
impaired or affected thereby."

30
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Federal Insurance Co. vs. 1 1amiami Trail 1'onrs,
C'.i\. 5, 117 .Fed. :!d 794, 796, holds that the provisions
:>f a fire poliey on a bus with the standard or union
dause Inakes an independent contract and the proYi~tons:

"inure to the contracts of both owner and
Inortgagee, and are enforceable by either, unless
the fault of one or the other or both has stripped
him of his power to enforce."

Ramsey vs. Farmers 1llutual Insurance Co., 2:>-t
:\lo. Appeal 1102, 139 S'Y 2d 10:!7 at 1029, says that
the open Inortgage clause makes the mortgagee's rights
no greater than the mortgagee's, but the "union'' clause:
"Establishes a separate contract of insurance
between the mortgagee and the insurer, which
contract may not be nullified by any act of insured alone."
In Oklahoma State Union vs. Folsom, Okla.
1958, 3:25 P. 2d 1053, an action was brought for loss
under a fire policy on a farm building which was a
brooder house and should have taken a higher rate. It
was argued that this invalidated the policy ab initio,
despite which the Court held the mortgagee's interest
would not be defeated, citing from an earlier Oklahmna case, JV estern Insurance Co. vs. Hughes, 179
Okla. :25-J., 66 P. 2d., 1956, that the mortgagee's contract
was cmnpletley independent of the insured's rights and
would be Yalid even though the insurance policy was
void ab initio.
Respondent raised the point before the trial court
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that recovery by the appellant should be limited to
"direct and accidental loss" since that was the general
coverage of the insurance policy. This would be contrary to the foregoing authorities, which hold that the
rights of the mortgagee go beyond those of the mortgagor and the mortgagee is protected against any act
of the mortgagor. The language of the loss payable
clause is itself proof that the loss payable has no such
limitations. Loss from concealment, embezzlement, or
conversion would likewise not be direct or accidental
loss, and yet coverage as to those causes is specifically
excluded from the loss payable clause unless a special
premium is paid; which is another way of saying that
those losses would be covered'Rnless excluded by the
language of the clause. In a similar way, loss from
other acts of the mortgagor, such as intentionally
destroying the vehicle, are covered if they result from
an act of the mortgagor, because they have not been
specifically excluded from the loss payable clause.
The different situations of mortgagor and mortgagee are indicated by 29 Am . .Jur. on Insurance, Section 731, which concludes with the statement that the
restriction is on the mortgagor only and that he could
not recover under the policy even if he paid the loss
and sought to be subrogated to the mortgagee's rights,
'vhich are admitted to exist despite the conduct of the
mortgagor, which would prevent his own recovery.
It thus appears that the plain language of the loss
payable clause has been held to mean what it says,
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rwmely that the loss payable payee will haYe his rights
ttnd that the protection will not be invalidated by "ally
ad or neglect of the lessee, mortgagor, or owner." There
are two customary forms of clauses used b"' insurance
cmnpanies, and the difference between thern is whether
or not the Inortgagee's rights go beyond those of the
Inortgagor. Respondent in this case must be held to
know this difference, and should now be held to respond
to the claim of loss by the appellant in the absence of
any showing that the appellant was in any way connected with intentional destruction of the vehicle. Of
course, there was no such claim made.
SlJl\I~IARY

'}llND CONCLUSION

The Trial Court's judgment in favor of respondent
is based upon two unsupported conclusions of law.
First, that respondent's policy was cancelled as to appellant; and, second, that respondent's policy did not
protect appellant against intentional destruction by the
insured.
In attempting to establish that their policy was
cancelled as to appellant, respondent relied solely upon
an ordinary business routine and practice. This finding
must fail as a matter of law because respondent failed
to establish an ordinary business routine and practice in
the following respects:
1. They failed to introduce any testimony from

the individual who actually deposits Notices of Cancellation in the mail ;
33
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2. They failed to introduce any Certificate of Mai

ing; and
3. Their Exhibit 4 contains only the name of tl

insured and does not mention appellant.
Contrast this incomplete business routine and prac
tice with the direct proof from four witnesses as t
non-receipt of any Notice of Cancellation. Responder
not only failed to establish any evidence whatsoevc:
from which the Court could find that Notice of Car
cellation had been mailed but also failed in their proo
that appellant received Notice of Cancellation as r(
quired by the loss payable clause.
In Point III, appellant has shown that appellan
does have a right of recovery from respondent unde
the Loss Payable Clause even though the truck wa
intentionally destroyed by the insured, Mark Lyon.
WHEREFORE, appellant respectfully request
this Court to reverse the Trial Court and enter judg
ment in favor of appellant and against responden
U.S.F. & G. in the sum of $3,250.00.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARDS, BIRD AND HAR1
716 Newhouse Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant
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